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In his unpublished diaries, the Unionist Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland from 1943 to 1963, Lord Brookeborough, recalls a meeting
with the Director-General of the BBC, Hugh Greene, and the Con -
troller of BBC Northern Ireland, Robert McCall, in Belfast on 1 June
1961: ‘I told the former [i.e. Greene] that we were not getting a fair deal
and perhaps because we objected to some previous programmes the
BBC were holding out on us’.1 Although Greene’s response is not
recorded, Brookeborough’s remarks are revealing nonetheless. For just
as the Unionist government had, since the partition of Ireland in 1921,
stressed the ‘British’ rather than ‘Irish’ credentials of Northern Ireland,
so it also wanted the BBC in Northern Ireland to act, and be treated, as
a fully British institution. However, given the continuing sensitivities
regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, and the terri-
torial claims made upon the North by successive governments in the
South of Ireland, the Unionist regime remained anxious about the
BBC’s output and concerned that this should conform to its own par-
ticular political and cultural outlook. Indeed, some years earlier
Brookeborough (then Basil Brooke) was reported to have declared at a
meeting of unionists that he ‘would like to have the Northern Ireland
station of the BBC operating under the control of the Ulster Govern-
ment’.2 Inevitably, the desire, on the part of unionists, for the BBC
in Northern Ireland to be both ‘British’ and under local (unionist)
control was destined to become a source of tension. As various
commentators have indicated, the willingness of unionism more gener-
ally to prioritise identification with ‘Ulster’ over identification with
‘Britain’ often led to departures from ‘British’ norms and political
 standards (Todd 1987). In the same way, unionist efforts to exercise
control over television broadcasting could, as Brookeborough’s
remarks suggest, threaten British broadcasting standards and inhibit
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the full integration of BBC Northern Ireland into the British broad-
casting system. 
Tensions between the ‘local’ and the ‘national’ were also a feature of
the arrival of the BBC’s radio service in Northern Ireland in 1924 ( just
three years after the partition of Ireland and the establishment of
separate parliaments on each side of the border). As the first Northern
Ireland Director, Gerard Beadle, recalls, regional controllers opposed
the centralisation of programme production in London during the
1920s on the grounds that this was ‘damaging to the proper reflection
of local life and talent’ (Beadle 1963: 23; see also Scannell 1993). The
coming of television to Northern Ireland in the 1950s, however, raised
the issue of Northern Ireland’s relationship to ‘British’ broadcasting in
a particularly acute form and led to a series of clashes over technology,
funds and programmes. While these conflicts often took the form
of arguments over costs and Northern Ireland’s entitlement to a ‘fair
deal’, they were also underpinned by fundamental questions regarding
the contested political status and cultural character of Northern
Ireland and its relationships with both Britain and the rest of Ireland.
Thus, while it has become common to stress the role played by
 television since the onset of the ‘troubles’ (from 1968 onwards), this
article will not only provide an account of a period of Northern Ireland
television history that has so far been largely neglected, but also indi-
cate how television was, in fact, implicated in the politics of Northern
Ireland from its very inception. 
It should, of course, be noted that, although commercial television
launched in England in 1955, it did not reach Northern Ireland until
31 October 1959 (when Ulster Television began transmission). For
virtually all of the 1950s, television in Northern Ireland was synonymous
with the BBC and it is therefore the BBC with which the article is
concerned. In particular, it focuses on three major disputes relating to
the extension of the television network to Northern Ireland, the pro-
vision of resources for local programme production and the ‘political’
content of programmes about Northern Ireland. In doing so, the
 article also investigates three significant landmarks in Northern
Ireland’s television history: the televising of the Coronation in 1953, the
launch of the first television programme from Northern Ireland, Ulster
Mirror, in 1954 and the transmission of the first live programme – an
edition of Press Conference – from Northern Ireland in 1955.
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A Part of the Network? A Part of the United Kingdom?
The Televising of the Coronation
Following the suspension of the television service during the Second
World War, the BBC resumed television broadcasts in June 1947. At this
stage, reception was confined to the greater London area, and, despite
the financial constraints imposed upon the BBC, the extension of
 television coverage became a priority. However, the speed at which
different regions would receive television differed sharply and soon led
to complaints concerning priorities (Briggs 1979: 246). There were also
grumblings in Northern Ireland and, in September 1949, the former
BBC Regional Director for Northern Ireland, George Marshall, wrote a
series of articles for a local Belfast paper, demanding that Northern
Ireland acquire ‘television along with the rest of the United Kingdom’
and calling on the British government to take action (Northern Whig,
7 September 1949: 6). Such complaints gained momentum two years
later when the extension of television to Northern Ireland was put on
hold. In 1949, the British government had approved the Corporation’s
plans to follow the opening of the first provincial relay station at Sutton
Coldfield (covering the Midlands) with the immediate construction of
three high-power transmitting stations at Holme Moss (covering the
North West, Yorkshire and Lincolnshire), Kirk O’Shotts (covering
central Scotland) and Wenvoe (covering the South West of England
and South Wales). These high-power stations were then to be supple-
mented by five medium-power transmitters near Aberdeen, Belfast,
Newcastle, Plymouth and Southampton.3 In March 1951, however, the
Assistant Postmaster General told the House of Commons that, because
of the government’s increased expenditure on defence, the construc-
tion of the medium-power transmitters would be postponed indefinitely
(Northern Whig, 15 March 1951: 1).
Andrew Stewart, the Controller of the Northern Ireland region from
1948 to 1952, was quick to respond to the news, writing to the BBC
Director General, Sir William Haley, a week later to express his concern
that, without a transmitter near Belfast, Northern Ireland would be ‘the
only region with no share at all in the Television Service’. Alluding to
the specific political pressures faced by the BBC in Northern Ireland,
he also drew attention to the sense of grievance that the continuing
‘exclusion of Northern Ireland from the television chain’ would
inevitably create within ‘Northern Ireland government and other
bodies’.4 Although Haley took the view that it would be difficult to
justify the cost of a station in Northern Ireland when the take-up
of licences was likely to be small, the lack of a television service in
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 Northern Ireland was clearly a matter of some political sensitivity.5 As
Arthur Aughey (1996: 32-4) observes, Ulster Unionists were particularly
preoccupied with the maintenance of political parity with Britain –
including, in the post-war period, parity of public provision – in order
to demonstrate that Northern Ireland was a legitimate part of the
United Kingdom (as well as fully ‘British’). Although television could
not be said to constitute the same kind of legal right as unemployment
benefits or pensions, there was nonetheless a strong feeling amongst
unionists that, if Northern Ireland was truly ‘British’, then it was
certainly entitled to ‘British’ television in the same way as every other
part of the UK. A TV Action Committee (consisting of representatives
of the radio and electrical trades) had been launched to canvas for
 television to be brought to Northern Ireland and it was, therefore,
not surprising that this group quickly gained the support of Unionist
politicians at both Stormont and Westminster. Despite some uncer-
tainty as to whether the televising of the event would actually occur, the
campaign gained a special sense of urgency due to the imminence of
the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in June 1953. The chair of the
Unionist Parliamentary Party at Westminster, Capt. L. Orr, contacted
the Assistant Postmaster General to express his concern that ‘Ulster
people’ would be unable to see ‘this great event’ (Belfast News-Letter,
23 September 1952: 4), while Colonel W.B. Topping (the Unionist
Home Secretary from 1956 to 1959) told a meeting of political sup-
porters that ‘it is not too much to hope … that Ulstermen and women
will have a chance of seeing the Coronation of their Queen’ (Belfast
 Telegraph, 26 September 1952: 1). Brookeborough added his voice
to the campaign, expressing dismay at the delay in extending the
television network to Northern Ireland and reporting on the represen-
tations that his party had made to the British government.6
The BBC did, in fact, have plans in place to erect temporary low-
power relay stations and, despite some reservations within the Cor-
poration concerning the financial wisdom of the scheme, the Acting
 Director General, Basil Nicolls, became involved in pressing the British
government for permission to proceed.7 Partly out of recognition of the
significance of the Coronation as a national occasion and partly as a
result of the political lobbying to which it had been subject, the British
government agreed to relax its previous embargo on the development
of television and permitted the BBC to proceed with stations at Pontop
Pike (near Newcastle-on-Tyne) and Belfast (at Glencairn) that would be
ready in time for the royal event (Belfast Telegraph, 22 October 1952: 1).
In the case of Belfast, the signal was to be routed through the high-
power transmitter at Kirk O’Shotts in Scotland (despite some objec-
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tions in Scotland that this should be used to extend the signal to
Aberdeen). Test transmissions took place in April 1953, followed by the
official launch of a local service on 1 May, when viewers in Northern
Ireland were formally welcomed to the network by an announcer in
London. At this stage, only five hundred television licences had been
sold in Northern Ireland and people reportedly gathered in front of
shop windows to witness the new phenomenon (Belfast News-Letter,
2 May 1953: 5). Although this figure had increased to 1,500 by the time
of the Coronation, considerably greater numbers – an estimated 20,000
– watched the ceremony, like the rest of the UK, in a combination of
private homes and public places (Belfast News-Letter, 3 June 1953: 5). 
However, while only a small proportion of the Northern Ireland
population may have seen the Coronation on television, the fact that
television had reached the region by the time of the event was of enor-
mous symbolic significance. As Cardiff and Scannell indicate, television
coverage of state ceremonials such as the Coronation has played a key
role in promoting national unity through the presentation of ‘national
events within a unified context’ (1987: 167). It was therefore a signifi-
cant coup for unionists that they were able to avoid exclusion from
the BBC network and become a part of the ‘national community’ that
watched the Coronation on television. This sense of national belong-
ing, and participation in a nationally important event, was further
reinforced by the television images themselves. Brookeborough
 travelled to London to attend the ceremony and was to be seen among
the assembled dignitaries.8 The presence of the Northern Ireland
General (and Brooke family member), Field Marshall Viscount
Alanbrooke, behind the throne (in his capacity as Lord High Constable
of England) also became a source of pride for those watching the
service ‘through Ulster eyes’ (Belfast News-Letter, 3 June 1953: 5). Such
was the potency of the symbolism of the Coronation for Ulster
Unionists that the Queen’s visit to Northern Ireland a month later
(in July 1953) also provided much of the material for the programme,
A Governor’s Notebook, broadcast on the occasion of the eventual open-
ing of a medium-power transmitter at Divis (above Belfast) on 21 July
1955. In his accompanying commentary, the Governor of Northern
Ireland, Lord Wakehurst, recalls the ‘impressive’ nature of the Queen’s
visit and assures viewers in Britain of the ‘overwhelming affection and
loyalty of the people of Northern Ireland’. 
In reality, of course, ‘the people of Northern Ireland’ did not consti-
tute the harmonious community, nor share the sense of loyalty to the
British Crown, that such descriptions suggested. The majority of the
Catholic population in Northern Ireland did not identify themselves
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as members of the British ‘nation’ and by and large boycotted the
Coronation festivities (Loughlin 1995; McIntosh 2002). There were
also fears amongst unionists that the IRA might seek to disrupt the
celebrations and, in spite of the extensive security measures in place,
Brookeborough recorded his anxieties concerning ‘possible outrages’
during the Queen’s tour.9 Given the way in which it became linked to
the coronation, it was therefore inevitable that the introduction of tele-
vision to Northern Ireland should have been controversial. Indeed,
such was the association of television with the impending celebrations,
that the Glencairn transmitter was placed under police guard from the
start of construction in case it became an IRA target (Belfast News-Letter,
2 June 1953: 5). While nationalists in the North did not oppose tele-
vision in principle, they were less than enthusiastic about its arrival in
Northern Ireland and were understandably suspicious of the role it was
going to play. Television was perceived as something of a distraction
from the social and economic problems facing the six counties and,
given the BBC’s custody of it, destined to reinforce a ‘British’ rather
than ‘Irish’ political and cultural outlook.10 Thus, when Brooke-
borough expressed his disappointment at the delay in TV’s arrival to
the Northern Ireland House of Commons, the nationalist MP Joseph
Connellan took the opportunity to ask if he did not realise that ‘there
are more people concerned with the unemployment problem than
with television’.11 When the building of the transmitter was announced
later the same month, the nationalist Irish News (based in Belfast)
adopted a similar stance, suggesting that television would become a
modern equivalent of ‘bread and circuses’:
‘Ulster’ intends to be gay with the aid of television and ratepayers’ money
instead of concentrating … on ways of lifting itself out of the unenviable
position of being industrially the black spot of these islands. (23 October
1952: 2)
Prior to the Coronation, the same paper was also critical of the BBC’s
‘anglicising influence’ and subsequently attacked the Queen’s Coron -
ation broadcast for defending a version of ‘the British way of life’ –
‘respect for the rights of minorities and the inspiration of a broad toler-
ance in thought’ – so at odds with the political realities of Northern
Ireland (Irish News, 26 May 1953: 2; 3 June 1953: 2).12 In this respect, the
success of unionists in employing television to bolster their ‘British’
credentials could only prove a source of disappointment to northern
nationalists who had no wish for local broadcasting to be so strongly
identified with unionism. Indeed, the sense that television was not
primarily for the benefit of the nationalist population was reinforced
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by the slow spread of the television signal to the north-west. Thus,
while the Divis transmitter put television in reach of 82 per cent of the
Northern Ireland population in 1955, it was not until two years later
that the television service was extended to Derry (Londonderry),
Northern Ireland’s second city, with a majority Catholic population
(Radio Times, 15 July 1955: 3). 
‘Northern Ireland in its True Light’: Ulster Mirror
The expansion of the BBC’s television service around the United King-
dom was soon followed by demands from the regions to produce their
own television programmes, rather than simply receive them from
London. This was also so of Northern Ireland where the opening of
a transmitter in Belfast quickly led to the expectation that Northern
Ireland would be in a position to broadcast its own programmes across
the network. The achievement of this, however, was even more difficult
than was the case in the other regions, given the lack of facilities (and
resources) to feed ‘live’ programmes into the network. This meant that
the earliest programmes about Northern Ireland were shot on film as
one-offs and then edited in, and transmitted from, London rather than
from Belfast. This was certainly so of the programme commissioned to
accompany the opening of the low-power transmitter at Glencairn,
Pattern of Ulster (tx. 26 May 1953), the first programme about Northern
Ireland to be shown on the network. Such was the significance of this
for Northern Ireland that the broadcast acquired something of the
status of a semi-official occasion. The programme was introduced by
the NI Prime Minister, Brookeborough, who suggested how television
had forged ‘another link’ between Northern Ireland and the rest of the
United Kingdom’.13 Members of the Northern Ireland government
joined the BBC management at the BBC in Belfast to watch the
programme, while Brookeborough himself went to the BBC in London
where he was provided with viewing facilities (Belfast Telegraph, 27 May
1953: 9; Diaries, 26 May 1953). 
The actual programme was designed to provide a portrait of life in
Northern Ireland and showed a range of ‘ordinary people’ – a farmer,
a shipyard worker, a policeman, a postman – engaged in everyday
 activities. However, it was also heavily establishment in tone, featuring
newsreel footage of the Queen Mother and Princess Margaret during
their visit to Northern Ireland in 1951 as well as footage of the
Northern Ireland Governor, Lord Wakehurst.14 The producer of the
programme, John Elliot, was fully conscious of the constraints that
‘Coronations and Station Openings’ had imposed upon him and, in
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line with a directive concerning ‘Broadcasts relating to Eire and
Northern Ireland’, took advice from the BBC in Northern Ireland
on ‘the sort of representation’ that was appropriate.15 As a result, he
considered his script to be both ‘pompous and superficial’ but none -
theless ‘“safe” for the BBC whose political position in Ulster seems to be
every bit as difficult as one would expect’.16 The ‘official’, celebratory
tone of the programme also ensured that it was well-received by
Northern Ireland unionists who were pleased by the ‘positive’ image of
the area that it created. The Head of Programmes at BBCNI, Henry
McMullan, reported to Elliot how much the programme had been
‘appreciated by different organisation engaged in “boosting Ulster”’
and that, following the programme’s transmission, there had been ‘a
number of requests from the Government, Tourist Board, and so on
to buy copies in 16mm size’.17 The Acting Controller of BBCNI, Cyril
Conner, also felt that the programme demonstrated the ‘tremendously
important field of possible publicity for Northern Ireland’ that tele-
vision provided and this idea of using television to promote a positive
image of the region continued to inform the thinking of both broad-
casters and unionist politicians.18
Indeed, given the enthusiasm that Pattern of Ulster had aroused, one
of the first tasks of the new Regional Controller (1953-6), Richard
Marriott, was to persuade the BBC in London to fund the production
of programmes in Northern Ireland on a regular basis. Two months
after the temporary transmitter had opened (and on his second day in
office), Marriott wrote to George Barnes, the Director of Television
Broadcasting, to suggest the creation of a Northern Ireland Television
Film Unit that would ‘provide regular programmes on film for
Northern Ireland only’ as well as occasional items of interest for the
network.19 Barnes, however, was unsympathetic to the idea, arguing that
the establishment of a film unit was ‘financially impracticable’ and that
the BBC could not afford to broadcast regional and national television
programmes simultaneously in the manner of radio.20 However, given
that this left the BBC in Northern Ireland entirely unable to cover local
events, Marriott continued to press the matter. Once again, political
considerations appear to have played a role in encouraging a change of
policy. 
As had been the case with Northern Ireland’s exclusion from the
network, the lack of television production facilities in Northern Ireland
soon led to political pressures on the BBC to treat Northern Ireland in
the same way as the rest of the UK and to provide the region with a ‘fair
share’ of television coverage. Unionist politicians were also concerned
that a lack of local programmes might lead to the Republic of Ireland
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obtaining more television coverage than Northern Ireland with the
result that the distinctions between the two parts of the island would
become blurred for British viewers. It was undoubtedly political sen-
sitivities such as these that led Marriott to complain to Barnes that, on
a day that the television newsreel might have covered the Ulster Grand
Prix, it showed footage of the Kerry Fair (in the South of Ireland)
instead.21 Although Barnes replied that ‘the number of stories from
Eire in the last eighteen months’ had been ‘very few indeed’ and that
he had ‘reproved the News people for their tactlessness’, he nonethe-
less conceded that this was a ‘problem’ that he had suspected might
arise.22 It was, however, a ‘problem’ that was destined to recur and, the
following year, the BBC Director General, Ian Jacob, reported to the
Board of Governors that he had received a letter of protest from
Brookeborough concerning no less than three incidents, on both tele-
vision and radio, that the Unionist Prime Minister regarded as having
caused ‘caused offence’.23 These included the transmission, on St
Patrick’s Day, of a travel film, set exclusively in the South of Ireland,
Ireland – Land of Welcome (1954), that had already been denounced in
the Northern Ireland House of Commons as a ‘flagrant piece of adver-
tising for the tourist industry of Southern Ireland’.24 George Barnes
once again conceded that the film’s transmission had been a mistake
given the lack of consultation with the Controller of BBCNI and the
‘inflammatory’ political situation prevailing within Northern Ireland.25
The underlying issue, however, remained unresolved and, when the
BBC broadcast another Irish film, The Promise of Barty O’Brien (1951),
the following month, Brookeborough was once again moved to
complain.26 Although Jacob felt that the film (which had already been
shown on television) did not deserve to be banned, he nonetheless
apologised for the timing of the programme’s transmission and prom-
ised to take steps to prevent the repetition of such incidents. 
Given the political problems to which the shortage of Northern
Ireland programmes led, and the prospect of an increase in NI viewers
following the opening of the medium-power transmitter at Divis,
Barnes eventually came round to supporting the idea of a local film unit
which, he argued, would compensate Northern Ireland for the Mobile
Control Rooms other regions were due to receive.27 Although the BBC
Board of Management approved the plan, it took considerable time to
agree the mechanics of how the unit would operate. Due to the absence
of post-production facilities in Northern Ireland, it was decided that,
following filming in Northern Ireland, processing, editing and dubbing
would take place in London (where some members of the film unit
would be permanently based). The unit’s main responsibility would be
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to produce a fifteen-minute magazine programme, broadcast once a
fortnight in Northern Ireland and (as a result of the use of the trans-
mitter at Kirk O’Shotts) in Scotland as well. Harry Govan, a Scotsman
with a background in TV newsreel production, became the pro -
gramme’s producer and the first edition of Ulster Mirror – ‘the first
magazine of its kind to be broadcast from any Region of the BBC’ – was
eventually transmitted on 26 November 1954 (Radio Times, NI Edition,
19 November 1954: 3). 
In his discussion of writing for television in the 1950s, Arthur  Swinson
(1955: 78) distinguishes three kinds of television documentary: the
dramatized documentary, the actuality documentary and the magazine
documentary. The magazine programme, he suggests, was the least
‘serious’ of these, avoiding political and sociological depth and concen-
trating on ‘the sights and sounds of life … curious places and interest-
ing people’ (ibid.: 99). However, although Ulster Mirror conformed to a
‘magazine’ format in providing a mix of stories about Ulster ‘life’, it also
incorporated elements of the television newsreel in its coverage of
items of topical interest. The items it selected, however, rarely consisted
of political news but concentrated instead on reports from around the
region on developments in local industry and agriculture, improve-
ments in Northern Ireland’s economic and social infrastructure, and
sporting events. The first programme, for example, included items on
the resurfacing of Belfast streets, the reconstruction of the harbour
at Portavogie and potato picking in Coleraine. However, while the
programme may have avoided coverage of overtly political events, its
selection and treatment of subjects were nonetheless implicitly political
in character and supportive of a unionist outlook. Hence, the first
programme concluded with highly deferential coverage of the
Unionist Prime Minister and his wife, Lady Brookeborough, prior to
their departure for Australia and New Zealand. Subsequent editions
reported on their arrival in Australia and their return, some months
later, to Northern Ireland. The initial programme also began with a
shot (repeated in all subsequent episodes) of the processional avenue
leading to the Parliament Building at Stormont (viewed through open-
ing gates). Built in 1932 to reinforce the grandeur of the Northern
Ireland political regime (Loughlin 1999), the Stormont building had
become an icon of Unionist rule in Northern Ireland, and its use in the
programme necessarily aligned it with the status quo. It is therefore not
surprising that the programme should have quickly won the admiration
of unionist politicians who pressed for it to be shown to ‘people across
the water’ in order to ‘let them see Northern Ireland in its true light’.28
As a result, it was something of a coup for both the BBC and the
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Unionist government when it was agreed that the programme should
be scheduled for network transmission following the opening of the
new transmitter at Divis in April 1955. The erection of the transmitter
was, in fact, featured in the first UK edition of the programme (tx.
28 April 1955), along with items on linen and fishing and scenes from
the Irish Cup final in Belfast.
‘A Bad Effect on All Viewers’: Press Conference and Highlight
Given the way in which programmes such as Pattern of Ulster and Ulster
Mirror largely reinforced a unionist world-view, Cathcart (1984: 174)
suggests that the ‘Unionist government and the unionist majority did
not envisage that the new medium would have anything other than a
positive, promotional role’. This, however, was only a part of the story.
Although, as previously noted, the Unionist government would have
liked greater control of local broadcasting, it was nonetheless appre -
hensive of the Beveridge Committee’s recommendations for the
 devolution of broadcasting (in 1949) on the grounds that this might
provide their political opponents with a greater say over the content
of broadcasting. Thus, when the British government’s White Paper
on Broadcasting (1949: 6-7) proposed the establishment of ‘national’
Broadcasting Councils in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, this
was opposed by the NI Cabinet on the grounds that the Unionist
government might be unable to exercise effective control over appoint-
ments to a Council that was explicitly intended to be ‘representative
and independent’.29 Moreover, because local programming was so
minimal, there were constant anxieties concerning the flow of tele-
vision images from London and the impact that these might have, both
locally and in Britain. This led, as already noted, to careful scrutiny of
the programmes entering Northern Ireland over the television network
and to regular complaints to the BBC management should these not
prove to be to the NI government’s liking. The tension between what
the unionists wanted television to show and what programme-makers in
London believed to be suitable for broadcast was also demonstrated by
the NI Prime Minister’s own television appearance – live across the
network – in 1955. This was, in fact, the first live broadcast from
Northern Ireland and was made possible by the despatch of a mobile
Outside Broadcasting Unit from England. The original idea had been
that there should be a Northern Ireland edition of the panel show,
Animal, Vegetable, Mineral, but this proved impracticable and an edition
of the mainly political interview programme, Press Conference, was
chosen instead. Although the BBC in Northern Ireland proposed a
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discussion of political devolution involving the Northern Ireland
 Governor, Lord Wakehurst, it was subsequently agreed that the NI
Prime Minister himself should participate.30 Even before he became
Prime Minister, Brookeborough had been a keen advocate of publicity
for Northern Ireland and, as PM, chaired the Cabinet Publicity Com -
mittee. He was therefore quick to appreciate the value of television as a
vehicle of both good and bad publicity for the Unionist cause and was
happy to appear on television when the opportunity arose.31 In the case
of Pattern of Ulster, however, he had been recorded on film and spoke in
his official capacity as NI Prime Minister. In Ulster Mirror, the filming
had been silent and the narrator simply quoted from the PM’s speeches
while Brookeborough himself was shown relaxing at home or engaging
in official duties. His appearance on Press Conference (tx. 17 November
1955), therefore, was not only the first occasion on which he was
 actually interviewed on television but also interviewed live. Although, as
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, he was accorded the due civilities,
unlike Ulster Mirror, he was also treated as a politician who could be held
accountable for the policies of the government which he led. Thus,
while the programme involved a rehearsal, and took place in the Prime
Minister’s own room in Stormont, the circumstances of transmission
meant that Brookeborough’s capacity to stage manage the event was
necessarily restricted.
The programme was presented by Francis Williams and the inter-
viewers consisted of Henry Fairlie of the Spectator, William Hardcastle of
the Daily Mail and the local journalist John (‘Jack’) Sayers of the Belfast
Telegraph (who was already a regular contributor to BBC radio broad-
casts). Although the interview was conducted under amicable con-
ditions, the questions were often quite searching and covered a number
of politically sensitive topics: the consequences of partition; the
 activities of the IRA in England and Ireland; the role of the over-
whelmingly Protestant auxiliary police force, the B Specials; the
absence of conscription in Northern Ireland; the lack of political oppo-
sition in Stormont and the Unionist domination of local councils in
predominantly nationalist areas (such as the city of Derry). Although
Brookeborough was provided with the opportunity, at the end of the
programme, to speak directly to ‘viewers in England, Scotland and
Wales’, it was evident that the programme did not provide the propa-
ganda boost that unionists had expected. Brookeborough himself felt
that the programme was ‘unbalanced’ and had dwelt too much on the
‘political’ and not enough on ‘the life of Ulster’.32 This sentiment was
echoed in the unionist Belfast Telegraph (18 November 1955: 5) which
complained that almost ‘the whole half-hour was taken up with
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 questions about partition, the IRA, “gerrymandering” and the absence
of conscription’, and that it was only in ‘a brief winding-up that Lord
Brookeborough had a chance to talk to cross-Channel viewers about
the more positive side of Northern Ireland life’.33 The programme
also provided ammunition to the government’s opponents and the
nationalist Irish News (18 November 1955: 1) took advantage of the
occasion to run a front-page headline declaring ‘Brookeborough
under fire on television’. The programme also attracted some press
attention in Britain where one critic felt that Brookeborough may have
come across as ‘impressively photogenic’ but nevertheless gave off
the impression that ‘he secretly regarded the Southern Irish as not
absolutely dissimilar from Fuzzy-wuzzys’ (Maurice Richardson in the
Observer, quoted in the Belfast Telegraph, 21 November 1955: 4).34
In this respect, the programme provides a good illustration of the
clash between the official view of Northern Ireland that Unionists
sought to project and the alternative political perspective that they tried
to discount. In his concluding remarks, Brookeborough more or less
ignored the preceding discussion, and its references to partition and
the position of the Catholic minority, by differentiating Northern
Ireland from the traditional stereotypes of the ‘Irish’ and character-
ising the six counties as exclusively Protestant and British:
I’d like you, especially viewers across the water, to forget the sort of music-
hall idea about an Irishman. You won’t find an Irishman, or an Ulsterman,
walking about in a semi-tailed coat and a battered top hat and a shillelagh –
I’ve never seen one in my life. You won’t see the pig sitting in the drawing
room … You will find a hardy, grand, self-reliant, individualistic race …
We’ve got the greatest industries – shipbuilding, the biggest shipyard in the
world, and our linen industry is famous … You will see some of the finest
farming in the United Kingdom … You will find the most modern methods.
You will find in their houses not pigs, but you will find the latest type of
cooker, the Aga, refrigerators, probably a television set … You will find that
here in this small community you’ve got people just like yourselves,
with tremendous loyalty to the Crown and a devotion to all things that are
British. 
In many respects, it is this view of Northern Ireland that the Ulster Mirror
series may also be seen to have been upholding. It too sought to high-
light the modernity of ‘Ulster’, drawing attention to the successes of
Northern Ireland industry and agriculture and reporting on develop-
ments (such as new housing, new schools and new hospitals) that
demonstrated the social and economic advances that Northern Ireland
was making (and, by implication, the North’s economic superiority
over the South). It also recorded various forms of official ceremony
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(the opening of the Northern Ireland Parliament), the activities of the
Northern Ireland Governor and his wife and royal visits (by the Queen,
the Duchess of Gloucester and Lord Mountbatten) that reinforced the
actuality of the union between Northern Ireland and Britain. It is there-
fore significant that the Ulster Mirror team should have filmed parts of
Press Conference for use in its own programme (broadcast shortly after-
wards on 28 November). However, while this edition includes the whole
of Brookeborough’s concluding speech, it completely ignores all the
political arguments that had preceded it. If unionists felt that the Press
Conference interview had concentrated on ‘politics’ at the expense of
‘Ulster life’, then it could be said that the Ulster Mirror series accom-
plished the reverse, focusing on selected aspects of life in ‘Ulster’ but
studiously avoiding the political issues dividing the community. This
included the omission of any reference to the Westminster elections of
May 1955 when 23.5 per cent of the local electorate voted for Sinn Féin
and two Sinn Féin candidates, who were in prison at the time, were
elected to the British parliament (Rose 1971: 96).
There was, however, a price to be paid for this. Although the Ulster
Mirror series succeeded in gaining network transmission in April 1955,
it soon became apparent that its emphasis upon positive publicity for
Northern Ireland, and lack of genuine news, constituted less than
compulsive viewing for viewers in Britain, particularly following the
launch of Independent Television (ITV) in September 1955. Despite
complaints from BBCNI that the programme was in danger of becom-
ing an ‘afterthought’, the series was rescheduled from its early evening
slot to later in the evening. At the end of the year, the programme was
restricted to quarterly rather than fortnightly transmissions and then
cancelled after only two editions on the grounds that it had become
uneconomic. Ironically, the demise of local NI programming destined
for a network audience occurred at a time when events in Northern
Ireland were set to command the increased attention of people in
Britain. However, given the character of these events, it is also unlikely
that Ulster Mirror would have been in a position to cover them.
In December 1956, the IRA launched ‘Operation Harvest’ aimed
primarily at RUC barracks in the border counties (but including
amongst its early targets a BBC radio transmitter in Londonderry).
Given the news of the raids, the Television Talks Department in London
decided to include an interview with the southern Irish journalist Harry
Craig in its early evening topical programme, Highlight (tx. 14 Decem-
ber 1956). Although Craig agreed that the use of force by the IRA
would not end partition, he rejected the idea that the IRA were ‘poten-
tial delinquents’ and reminded the interviewer that, for many in
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Ireland, ‘the North of Ireland is an occupied territory, with foreign
troops’. While the interview provoked little reaction in Britain, the
programme caused consternation amongst unionists in Northern
Ireland and led to a stream of complaints, including one on behalf of
the NI Prime Minister demanding ‘a disclaimer or an apology’.35 This
led the BBC to broadcast an announcement later that evening stating
that there had been ‘no intention whatsoever’ of ‘condoning’ the IRA’s
violent activities. The Deputy Director of Television Broadcasting, Cecil
McGivern, was also asked to investigate the matter and concluded that
the subject had been ‘much too important, inflammatory and political’
to have been included in the Highlight programme.36 Brookeborough
himself was offered a ‘right to reply’ and flew to London to take part in
an edition of Panorama (tx. 17 December 1956) presented by Richard
Dimbleby. In comparison to Press Conference the previous year, this
proved to be an incredibly ‘soft’ interview in which the Prime Minister
was encouraged to say more or less what he wanted and there was no
attempt to press him on the circumstances in Northern Ireland that
continued to fuel paramilitary activity (with Dimbleby simply content
to ask Brookeborough, ‘Now what is this IRA?’).37 As a result, there was
general satisfaction with the Prime Minister’s performance amongst the
unionist press and his political supporters in Northern Ireland (Belfast
Telegraph, 18 December 1956: 5). However, the reporting of the IRA’s
activities in London continued to prove a matter of concern for the NI
government, and when the BBC broadcast a short newsreel, Ulster Alert,
the following month it was felt that it ‘gave the impression that Ulster is
an armed camp’ and that this was bound to have ‘a bad effect on all
viewers’, especially in Britain.38 In this case, the programme was entirely
sympathetic to the activities of police and troops. However, the very
suggestion of social division and conflict in Northern Ireland could
be perceived as damaging by the NI government given its efforts to
cultivate an image of ‘Ulster’ as just a ‘normal’ part of Britain. In his
interview with Dimbleby, Brookeborough had declared that ‘Northern
Ireland was ‘just the same part of the United Kingdom as your County
Sussex or Devon or Yorkshire or any County in Scotland or Wales’.
However, the problem for unionists was that this sense of attachment to
Britain was rarely reciprocated by the British themselves and, at the
time of his Panorama broadcast, Brookeborough records his frustrated
attempts to get the British Home Secretary ‘to declare that N.I. is like
the U.K. and to defend it’.39 Just as unionist politicians felt that they
could not always rely on British politicians in London to treat Northern
Ireland in the same way as other parts of the UK, so they were also
 reluctant to trust the British Broadcasting Corporation in London to
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represent the region in the way that they wished. Thus, it was not long
before there was a further outbreak of hostilities over Alan Whicker’s
report on Northern Ireland for the Tonight programme in January
1959 which unionists felt drew undue attention to unemployment and
 religious divisions (Cathcart 1984: 190-3, Hill 2006: 155).
Conclusion
Anxious that Northern Ireland should not be left behind or excluded
from the extension of television across the United Kingdom, Northern
Irish unionists were keen to bring television to ‘Ulster’. The Coronation
of 1953 provided a symbolic focus for these efforts and unionists were
particularly pleased that television enabled them to share the event with
the rest of the British ‘nation’. There was also considerable satisfaction
that the first programmes about Northern Ireland (Pattern of Ulster,
About Britain, Ulster Mirror) effectively projected the unionist version of
Northern Ireland to the rest of the United Kingdom. However, it also
became apparent that television could not always be relied upon to
provide the straightforward means of endorsement and promotion that
the unionists desired. As the experience of Press Conference indicated,
television could also open up Northern Ireland to an outside gaze and
expose the realities of a politically-divided society. It was undoubtedly
the transmission of ‘negative’ messages about Northern Ireland across
the UK network (rather than simply the local airwaves) that caused
unionists the greatest anxiety. However, as the 1960s proceeded (and
the modes of television coverage changed), it became increasingly
difficult for the unionist establishment to exercise control over the
production and circulation of television images of Northern Ireland,
particularly in the face of mounting evidence of social and political
conflict. As this article indicates, however, the tension between the wish
of unionists to exploit television for their own political benefit and the
capacity of network television to expose Northern Ireland’s political
faultlines was a feature of television in Northern Ireland from practi-
cally the beginning.
Notes
Thanks to Trish Hayes at the BBC Written Archives Centre (BBCWAC) and staff at the
Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI). Thanks also to Martin McLoone for
discussions on the subject. 
1. Lord Brookeborough, Diaries 1956-63, PRONI D/3004/D/45.
2. ‘Monthly Report: Northern Ireland Region’, April 1946, BBCWAC R34/748/3.
3. ‘Proposals to Extend the Television Service’, 31 August 1949, BBCWAC T16/230/1.
967 02 pages 213-416:Layout 1  30/11/07  12:20  Page 268
269
The BBC and the Arrival of Television in Northern Ireland
4. ‘Television Development’, Memo from CNI to DG, 20 March 1951, BBCWAC
T16/222/1.
5. Letter from DG to CNI, 27 March 1951, BBCWAC T16/222/1.
6. Parliament of Northern Ireland, Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, House of
Commons, 1 October 1952, vol. xxxvi, col. 1263.
7. Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors, 4 September 1952, BBCWAC
R1/20/1.
8. He also recorded a message of homage to the Queen for the radio, broadcast the
same evening, in which he proclaimed that ‘Ulster men and women’ were ‘first and
last … loyal’ (Belfast Telegraph, 3 June 1953: 6).
9. Diaries 1956-63, 3 July 1953.
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33. Given that it had been the policy of the BBC in Northern Ireland to avoid reference
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21 November 1955: 3). 
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